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Assessing the importance of borrowing constraints for college entry is key for ed-
ucation policy analysis in the U.S. economy. I present a computable dynamic general
equilibrium model with overlapping generations and incomplete markets that allows
me to measure the fraction of households constrained in their college entry decision.
College education is ﬁnanced by family transfers and public subsidies, where transfers
are generated through altruism on part of the parents. Parents face a trade-oﬀ between
making transfers to their children and own savings. Ceteris paribus, parents who ex-
pect lower future earnings transfer less and save more. Data from the 1986 Survey of
Consumer Finances give support to this mechanism. I show that this trade-oﬀ leads
to substantially higher estimates of the fraction of constrained households compared
to the results in the empirical literature (18 instead of 8 percent). The model also pre-
dicts that an increment in parents’ earnings uncertainty decreases their willingness to
provide transfers. In combination with rising returns to education, which makes college
going more attractive, this boosts the number of constrained youths and explains why
family income has become more important for college access over the last decades in
the U.S. economy.
Keywords: College Enrolment, Borrowing Constraints,Parental Transfers, House-
hold Savings, Dynamic General Equilibrium Models
JEL classiﬁcation: I20, I22, D58, D91
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In the United States, the wage premium of college graduates relative to high school graduates
increased by around 30 percent between 1980 and 2000 (Katz and Autor (1999)). This period
was also characterized by a dramatic rise of college tuition fees and an ampliﬁcation of the
within-group earnings inequality. College participation rates stagnated, while the enrolment
gaps between students from diﬀerent family income groups widened (Ellwood and Kane
(2000), Carneiro and Heckman (2003) and Kane (2006)).
This suggests that ﬁnancial constraints prevent a larger share of low-income households
from sending their children to college, leading to a sluggish adjustment of college participation
despite the surge in the college premium Kane (2006). Whether this is true or not is subject
to an ongoing debate in the empirical literature. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Carneiro
and Heckman (2003) argue that short-term cash constraints around college age are binding
only for a small fraction of households. They ﬁnd that long-term factors (family background
variables) which aﬀect pre-college education can account for the main part of enrolment gaps
by income. However, it is not clear to what extend long-term factors can account for the
widening of the enrolment gaps observed over time. Belley and Lochner (2007) document
that the impact of family income on college attendance rates increased dramatically between
1980 and 2000, even after controlling for family background. They also document that the
enrolment patterns observable in the data are at variance with a simple model of college
attendance, even if they allow for borrowing constraints. Hence, there remains considerable
disagreement about the role of borrowing constraints (Kane (2006)).
In this paper, I want to shed further light on the role of ﬁnancial constraints. In particular,
I address the following two questions:
1. Are borrowing constraints quantitatively important in determining college entry?
2. As the economic environment has changed in the U.S. over the course of the last
decades, have borrowing constraints become more limiting?
I answer these questions with the help of a computable overlapping generation model that
endogenizes the college enrolment decisions. Borrowing by young households for college
education is not permitted; they thus have to relay on parental transfers and public support
in the form of subsidies in order to cover college expenses. This allows me to measure the
fraction of adolescents that would like to attend college but cannot do so because of market
imperfections. I derive the distribution of parental transfers endogenously in my model; this
enables me to study the impact of the recent changes in the economic environment on college
attendance and on borrowing constraints.
I show that the enrolment gaps produced by the model narrow considerably once I control
for so-called long-term factors. Thus, the ﬁndings are consistent with Carneiro and Heckman
(2002). Yet, I ﬁnd that a substantial fraction (18 percent) of all households are borrowing
constrained. This shows that even when enrolment gaps are narrow, borrowing constraints
may aﬀect a large part of the population. The results thus help to resolve the disagreement in
the empirical literature with respect to the quantitative importance of borrowing constraints.
1I then examine how the economy behaves if I increase the college premium, the tuition
fees and the earnings inequality to values observable in the U.S. economy around 2000. I
ﬁnd that that the model replicates the college enrolment patterns presented in Belley and
Lochner (2007) very well. In particular, the model predicts (i) a slight increase in the
number of college graduates, (ii) a substantial increment in the impact of family income on
the college enrolment of young households, and a (iii) stable ability-enrolment pattern. The
model predicts that the fraction of constrained households rose sharply from 18 percent to
40 percent between 1980 and 2000. The results thus show that all enrolment patterns can
be explained within the same framework, and that these patterns are consistent with an
increase in the number of constrained households.
Despite the sharp rise in the number of households aﬀected, the model implies that the
correlation of educational attainment across generations actually decreased. This is perhaps
surprising, as the literature in general assumes that tighter borrowing constraints lead to
a higher persistence of education across generations. Ellwood and Kane (2000) as well as
Belley and Lochner (2007) document that the correlation between parental education and
college enrolment of the child has become weaker over the course of the last decades.
Understanding the behavior and the determinants of parental transfers is crucial for my
results. The model endogenously accounts for the initial distribution of wealth of young
households by assuming that altruistic parents provide transfers to their children.1 More
precisely, I assume that old households (’parents’) are altruistic and incorporate the utility
of their descendants (’young households’) in their maximization problem. I follow Laitner
(2001) and allow for imperfect altruism; parents may weight their children’s utility less than
their own utility. In the model, I distinguish between two diﬀerent levels of human capital
(’college education’ and ’high school’) and endogenize college choice. Parental transfers can
be used to ﬁnance college education, which is assumed to be costly.
I also allow for idiosyncratic labor income shocks, which enables me to analyze the eﬀects
of the rise of the within-group inequality that has been documented for the U.S. (Krueger
and Perri (2006)). Incorporating inequality within generations and education levels also
allows me to distinguish diﬀerent ability levels.
I solve the model numerically and calibrate the parameters such that key features of the
U.S. economy are matched. I then compare two diﬀerent steady-state equilibria in order to
evaluate changes over time.
Altruism implies that there exists a trade-oﬀ for parents between investing in their own
future or in the future of their children. This means that even children from rich families
1Gallipoli et al. (2006), and Ionescu (2007), among others, assume that the initial distribution of wealth is
exogenous for young households. Hanushek et al. (2004) assume that transfers are generated by assuming a
’joy-of-giving’ motive, which implies that transfers depend only on parental wealth but not on the economic
situation of the child. This is at odds with empirical evidence showing that inter-vivos transfers are negatively
correlated with the child’s permanent income (Cox (1990)). Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and Cunha (2005)
use an altruistic framework to analyze the parental trade-oﬀ between human capital investments at diﬀerent
stages of life. Because their focus is on early education, they model parents only up the age when their
children enter college. I show that all stages of the parental life cycle are important in order to understand
transfer behavior.
2can be constrained in their college decision because their parents are not willing to provide
enough resources. Indeed, I show that the transfer ﬂows generated by the model imply
that parents consider their oﬀspring’s utility by 30 percent less than their own utility. This
worsens the position of the child and pushes the number of constrained households up. In
fact, I show that the parental trade-oﬀ explains why borrowing constraints are binding for a
substantial fraction of the population, even though enrolment gaps across diﬀerent income
groups appear to be narrow, after controlling for long-term factors.
The model also allows me to study how the trade-oﬀ between savings and transfers
evolves over time. I show that the interplay between the rise in the between-group and in the
within-group inequality explains why borrowing constraints became more limiting over time.
The rise in the college premium (between-group inequality) makes college investment more
proﬁtable, even for low-ability youths. However, their parents accumulate additional savings
in order to self-insure against the increase in the within-group inequality, which I model as an
increment in the variance of earnings shocks. This implies that accumulating more savings is
preferred over investing in college education for parents with low-ability children. It follows
from the model that the increase in the enrolment gap is more pronounced for low-ability
students. This is exactly what one observes in the data as well (Belley and Lochner (2007)).
Since earnings of high school graduates ﬂuctuate more than the earnings of college grad-
uates (Hubbard et al. (1995)) and earnings account for a bigger fraction of total income for
high school graduates, this channel also helps to explain the degree of intergenerational per-
sistence of educational attainment. In my framework, children of college graduated parents
are – all other things equal – up to 5 percent more likely to enter college, because their
parents need to provide less savings for their own future. Using transfers and savings data
from the 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), I ﬁnd empirical support for this key pre-
diction of the model: high school graduates save signiﬁcantly more than college graduates
during the last 20 years before retirement if one controls for wealth and income. In turn,
college graduates in that age group provide signiﬁcantly more transfers.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. I present the model in section 2.
Section 3 introduces the equilibrium deﬁnition, while the calibration is explained in Section
4. We discuss our results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
I consider a life cycle economy with altruistic parents. As in Laitner (2001), altruism may
be imperfect. Parents provide transfers to their children. They face constraints on their
resources: all credit markets are closed, implying that they can neither borrow against their
own future income nor against the future income of their descendants. I allow for idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks during working life. Moreover, I endogenize college choice by
assuming that parental transfers can be used to pay for college education. These assump-
tions allow me to study the eﬀects of an endogenously generated initial distribution of assets
on college enrolment, and to analyze the determinants of the initial asset distribution in a
realistic life cycle setting.
32.1 The Life Cycle of a Household
There is a continuum of agents with total measure one. I assume that the size of the
population is constant over time. Let j denote the age of an agent, j ∈ J = {1,2,...,Jmax}.
Agents enter the economy when they turn 23 (model period j = 1). Before this age, they
belong to their parent household and depend on its economic decisions. During the ﬁrst 40
years of their ’economic’ life, agents work. This implies that the agents work up to age
62 (model period Jwork = 40). Retirement takes place at the age of 63 (j = 41), which
is mandatory. When agents turn 53 (j = 31), their children of age 23 form their own
household. This implies a generational age gap of 30 years. It is assumed that there is
one child household for each parent household. Agents face a declining survival probability
after their children leave home. Terminal age is 83 (Jmax = 60). Since annuity markets are
closed by assumption, agents may leave some wealth upon the event of death. The remaining
wealth of a deceased parent household is passed on to its child household.
2.2 Transfers
At age 53, a parent’s household child becomes independent and forms its own household.
Gale and Scholz (1994) report that the mean age of givers is 55 years in the 1983-1986 Survey
of Consumer Finances. I assume that transfers are generated by one-sided altruism, that
is, parents care about the lifetime well-being of their mature children, but not the other
way round. I abstract from strategic interaction and assume that parents provide part of
their own wealth as an initial endowment at the beginning of the economic life of the child
household. Part of this endowment (or all of it) can be in form of investment in human
capital. It is important to notice that the assumption of altruism implies that parents will
combine education investment and ﬁnancial transfers in such a way that the child’s lifetime
utility is maximized given the total amount of wealth that parents wish to pass on to their
descendants. Put diﬀerently, children may not agree with their parents on the total amount
which is being transferred, but certainly on the mix between human capital investment and
ﬁnancial transfers.2
The assumptions regarding the life cycle and the transfer behavior are summarized in
Figure 1.
2.3 Labor Income Process
During each of the 40 periods of their working life, agents supply one unit of labor inelas-







j=1 is a deterministic age proﬁle of average labor productivity of an agent with
education level e:
e ∈ E = {highschool(hs),college(col)} (1)
2In the following, I will use the terms ’ﬁnancial transfers’, ’inter vivos transfers’ and ’inter vivos transfers’
as labels for capital transfers which take place during lifetime of both donor and recipient.
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Figure 1: Life cycle and Generation Structure
For retired agents, εe
j =0 .
ηj,e describes the stochastic labor productivity status of a j-year old agent with education
level e. Given the level of education e, I assume that the labor productivity process is identical
and independent across agents (no aggregate productivity shocks) and that it follows a ﬁnite-
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I assume that children of college graduates have - on average - productivity levels above
average, while high school graduates draw shocks that are below average. Carneiro et al.
(2006) show that maternal education has a strong positive impact on children’s cognitive
achievement. I interpret the initial draw as a proxy for ability during adolescence, that is,
ability before college education or labor market entry occurs. In particular, I assume that
the probability to dropout from college decreases with the level of the initial productivity
shock. Consistent with empirical evidence regarding the intergenerational correlation of
schooling, this and the the fact that the productivity in the ﬁrst period of working life
depends on parental education, implies that college education is positively correlated across
5generations. The parental education level inﬂuences only the initial draw of the productivity
shock: From the second period onwards, the shocks evolve according to their respective
stochastic process. More speciﬁcally, I assume that the initial shock is governed by the
following transition matrices:
Q




initial,col(i,i ∈ I = {1,2,...,n})=P r ( i,i ∈{ 1,2,...,n}|η
30,col = η
col) (5)
2.4 Investment in Education and Borrowing Constraints
I distinguish between two levels of education, high school and college.3 Upon entering the
economy, all households possess a high school degree. They (or their parents) decide on
investing in college education, before any other economic action is taken. Investment in
college education takes place at the beginning of the lifetime. College education requires
large investments that are risky and lumpy. It is risky because there is a certain probability
that the child drops out. In addition, the earnings stream is stochastic which increases the
uncertainty. Dropout rates are high in the U.S., as well as in other OECD countries (see
Akyol and Athreya (2005)). Consistent with evidence from the empirical literature, see e.g.
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2007), I assume that children with lower levels of ability are
more likely to drop out. Since dropout rates are higher during the ﬁrst years of the college
studies (when returns to college education are low), dropouts face the same earnings process
as high school graduates. Consequently, only students who actually graduate from college
enjoy higher mean earnings during their working life. This implies that college education is
an indivisible and lumpy investment.4 Transfers and savings cannot be negative; parents are
thus required to ﬁnance their children’s college education out of their own resources.
2.5 Taxes and Social Security Beneﬁts
During working life, households pay a proportional tax on their labor income. All households
also pay a proportional tax on their capital income.
Tax revenue from labor income and capital income taxation is used by an inﬁnitely lived
government in order to ﬁnance pension beneﬁts pen. I assume that pensions are independent
of the employment history of a retiree.
3 The Households’ Recursive Problem
I distinguish between young households (children) and parent households. I use a subscript
y for young households and a subscript p for parental households.
3The share of high school dropouts is small in the data, see Rodriguez et al. (2002) who measure a share
of 17 percent in the 1998 SCF.
4See Akyol and Athreya (2005) and the references cited therein.
63.1 Young households
When parents die, young households inherit the wealth of their parents. I assume that young
households observe their parental wealth holdings. Therefore, I need to distinguish between
child households with deceased parents and young households that are expecting to inherit.
I make the following timing assumption: death takes place at the end of the period, after
the consumption and savings decision has been made. Bequests are then distributed at the
beginning of the next period.
3.1.1 Young households with deceased parents
Consider a household during working age (j ∈ Jw = {1,...,30}) whose parent household
is dead. At age j, this household consumes cy,d and has end-of-period wealth holdings of
a 
y,d, where the subscript y,d indicates a young household with deceased parents. Given a
discount factor β, a rate of return to capital r, a wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor w,














∀j ∈{ 1,...30 − 1} (6)
where Vy,d(.) is the value function of a young household with deceased parents and sy,d is
the vector of state variables in period j, which is given by
sy,d =( ay,d,e,η
j,e,j) (7)
Agents maximize (6) subject to the budget constraint5
a
 
y,d =( 1+r(1 − τk))ay,d +( 1− τw)ε
e
jη




The state space Sy,d of an household of type y,d thus includes four variables: own asset
holdings, ay,d ∈ R+, education level, e ∈ E, stochastic productivity, ηj,e ∈ Nj,e, and age
j ∈{ 1,...,30}. Notice that Sy,d = R+ × E × Ne ×{ 1,...,30}. Let P(E), P(Ne) and
P{1,...,30} be the power sets of E,Ne and {1,...,30}, respectively, and let B(R+) the Borel
σ-algebra of R+. It follows that Sy,d = B(R+) × P(E) × P(Ne) × P(Jw)i saσ-algebra on
Sy,d and that My,d=( Sy,d,Sy,d) is a measurable space. I will assume that the value function
Vy,d :Sy,d → R and the policy functions cy,d :Sy,d → R+ and a 
y,d :Sy,d → R+ are measurable
with respect to My,d.














When j = 30, child households become parent household in j + 1. This implies that they observe their
oﬀspring ’s initial productivity level which becomes part of their state vector sp,1.
73.1.2 Young households whose parents are alive
At any age j ∈{ 1,...,30}, a household whose parents are still alive consume cy,a and have
end-of-period wealth holdings of a 
y,a, where y,a denotes a young household whose parents
are alive. Its parent household has wealth holdings of ap
y,a. Since the child does not know
when the parent household dies, the value function is a weighted sum of the utility it receives
if the parent household dies and the utility which is obtained if the parent continues to live
for another period, where the parental survival probability ψj+30 serves as a weight. The















∀j ∈{ 1,...30 − 1} 6
where ψj+30 is the survival probability of the parent household, Vy,a(sy,a) denotes the value





Notice that children observe only their parents end-of-period asset holdings. This implies
that the law of motion of parental asset holdings is not part of the information set of the
child household.7
The household maximizes (9) subject to its current period budget constraint
a
 
y,a =( 1+r(1 − τk))ay,a +( 1− τw)ε
e
jη




If the parent household dies in period j − 1, the ﬂow budget constraint becomes
a
 









6If j = 30, the child household knows that its parent household will die for sure in the current period.














7I also experimented with a model in which children use the policy function of their respective parents’
problem in order to update their information about expected bequests. This adds another to variables to
the child household’s state space, namely the education and the productivity level of the parent households,
thereby resulting in a dramatic increase in CPU time needed to solve the model. I found that parental
asset holdings alone are suﬃcient to forecast future bequests. Including education and productivity did not
change the child’s behavior at all.
8Because a child household keeps track of its parents wealth holding, I need to extend the state
space Sy,a by ap
y,a ∈ R+. The state space contains now two continuous variables, and is given
by Sy,a = R+ ×R+ ×E ×Ne ×{1,...,30}. Similar to the problem of a child household with
deceased parents given above, I deﬁne a measurable space My,a=( Sy,a,Sy,a), with respect
to which Vy,a :Sy,a → R, cy,a :Sy,a → R+ and a 
y,a :Sy,a → R+ are measurable.
3.2 Parent Households
Consider now a parent household, 31 ≤ j ≤ Jmax. A parent household works during the
ﬁrst 10 years and is retired afterwards. The household faces a declining survival probability,
ψj < 1. In the following, I deﬁne the parent household’s problem in three diﬀerent stages.













∀j ∈{ 32,...40} (13)
where Vp,w(.) is the value function of a young household with deceased parents and sp,w is
the vector of state variables in period j given by
sp,w =( ap,w,e,η
j,e,j) (14)
Agents maximize (13) subject to the budget constraint
a
 
p,w =( 1+r(1 − τk))ap,w +( 1− τw)ε
e
jη




The state space is given by Sy,a = R+ × E × Ne ×{ 32,...40}. I deﬁne a measurable space
Mp,w=( Sp,w,Sp,w), with respect to which Vp,w :Sp,w → R, cp,w :Sp,w → R+ and a 
p,w :Sp,w →
R+ are measurable.
3.2.2 Parent Household, Retired
This household receives social security beneﬁts, pen, and chooses consumption cp,r and its
end-of-period wealth level a 
p,r. The optimization problem of this household can be written












where Vp,r(sp,r) is the value function, given the state vector sp,r. It follows that
sp,r =( ap,r,j) (17)
9The household maximizes (16) subject to
a
 









cp,r ≤ (1 + r(1 − τk))ap,r + pen (20)
The state space is now given by Sp,r = R+ ×{ 41,...,Jmax}. I construct a measurable
space Mp,r=( Sp,r,Sp,r), with respect to which I deﬁne Vp,r :Sp,r → R, cp,r :Sp,r → R+ and
a 
p,r :Sp,r → R+ to be measurable.
3.2.3 Parent Household, First Period
In their ﬁrst period (j = 31), parents incorporate the discounted lifetime utility of their
children. They choose their own savings a 
p,1 and the transfers to their child household in
such a way that their total utility is maximized. Transfers can be in form of assets (tra)
and investment in education (ed). Recall that the education level is a binary variable, that
is, ed ∈{ 0,1}, where ed = 0 if parents choose not to send their children to college and
ed = 1 if parents send their children to college. Expressed in terms of a Bellman equation,







+ς (E [Vy,a(sy,a)|ed =1 ]+E [Vy,a(sy,a)|ed = 0])
 
(21)
where ς is the intergenerational discount factor. I allow for imperfect altruism, that is,
0 ≤ ς ≤ 1. If ς = 0, parents care only about their own utility. The model thus nests a pure
life cycle economy (ς = 0) and a dynastic model (ς = 1) as extreme cases. Both Laitner
(2001) and Nishiyama (2002) show that the observable ﬂow of transfers is consistent with
an intermediate case. Clearly, the degree of altruism matters for parental transfer behavior.
Notice that it inﬂuences only the total amount of resources which is transferred, but does
not have any eﬀect on the division into education investment and ﬁnancial transfers.
Vp,1(sp,1) is the value function for a given state vector sp,1, where
sp,1 =( ap,1,e,η
j,e,i) (22)
Notice that the initial productivity level i becomes part of the parent household’s state space
because the child may drop out before graduating. i determines the probability to drop out.
Together with the fact that the income stream is stochastic, this implies that investment
in college risky. Therefore, whether parents invest in the children’s education beyond high
school depends on the diﬀerence between E [Vy,a(sy,a)|ed = 1], the expected utility from
10investing, and E [Vy,a(sy,a)|ed = 0], the value if they do not invest. More precisely, the
expected utility from investing is given by






where λ(i) is the probability that the child household completes college education success-
fully. The expected utility is thus a weighted average of the expected lifetime utility if the
child completes education and of the expected value of the household if it does not complete
education. If the child household enters college but does not complete college education,
the child household faces the same value function as a child household which does not enter
college education. The parental budget constraint is given by
a
 










where ν denotes the college subsidy the household receives if ed =1 ,κ denotes the ﬁxed
college expenses that the parent household pays. The subsidy level ν is a function of family
resources available for college investment. In the U.S., most programs are targeted towards
students of low income families. In this case, the amount of subsidies depends negatively on
the amount of family resources (see e.g. Feldstein (1995)).
Note that children may also receive end-of-life bequests. Because average bequests are
higher the more the parent saves in period j = 31, the value function of the child,Vy,a(sy,a),
is increasing and concave in ap,1. Because the parent household incorporates Vy,a(sy,a)i n
its decision problem in j = 31, it also incorporates the utility from leaving bequests. This
establishes a trade-oﬀ between transferring resources in the form of inter vivos transfers or in
the form of end-of-life bequests. Note that this mechanism would also work in the presence
of a perfect annuity market.
Using the fact that the state space of parents in their ﬁrst period is given by Sp,1 =
R+ × E × Ne ×{ 1,2,...,i}, I construct a σ-algebra on Sp,1 as Sp,1 = B(R+)×P({1,2,...,i})
×P(E) × P(Ne) where P({1,2,...,i}) is the power set of {1,2,...,i}. Mp,1=( Sp,1,Sp,1)i s
then a measurable space, which implies that Vp,1 :Sp,1 → R, cp,1 :Sp,1 → R+, a 
p,1 :Sp → R+,
tra :Sp,1 → R+ and ed :Sp,1 →{ 0,1} are measurable on Mp,1.
3.3 The Firm’s Problem
There is a continuum of ﬁrms, which I normalize to have total measure one. Firms are
competitive and take all prices as given. Thus, I assume a single representative ﬁrm. This
representative ﬁrm uses aggregate physical capital K and aggregate labor measured in eﬃ-
ciency units L to produce a single identical output good Y . The proﬁt-maximizing conditions
of the representative ﬁrm are
r + δ = FK(K,L) (25)
w = FL(K,L) (26)
where F(K,L) is a constant returns to scale production function.
113.4 The Government’s Problem
The inﬁnitely lived government administers the pension system and distributes college sub-
sidies. The government ﬁnances pension beneﬁts and subsidies by issuing a payroll tax on
labor and capital income. I impose that the budget of the government has to be balanced
in each period. Let Φ be a probability measure deﬁned over the measurable spaces My,d,
My,a, Mp,1,Mp,w and Mp,r, which result from the household problem as stated above.8
The government computes old-age pension beneﬁts, pen, as the average lifetime income of a















I assume that tax rate levied on capital, τk, is determined exogenously. The government’s














4 Deﬁnition of a Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
I now deﬁne the equilibrium that I study:
Deﬁnition 1 Given a replacement rate, rep, and a tax rate for capital income, τk , a col-
lege subsidy rule ν, a Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is a set of functions






p(sp), tra(sp,1), ed(sp,1), non-negative prices
of physical capital and of eﬀective labor, {r,w}, and set of probability measures on the state
spaces of the respective household problem as deﬁned in sections (3.1.2)-(3.2.3) such that the
following hold:
1. Given prices and policies, Vy,d(sy,d), Vy,a(sy,a), Vp,1(sp,1), Vp,w(sp,w) and Vp(sp) are the
solution to the household problem outlined in (3.1.2)-(3.2.3) with cy,d(sy,d), cy,a(sy,a),






ed(sp,1) being the associated policy functions.
8Notice that the total population size is normalized to one. The probability measure thus deﬁnes the
number of people (or equivalently, the total population share) facing a speciﬁc endowment with state vari-
ables.
122. The prices r and w solve the ﬁrm’s problem (25) and (26).
3. The government policies satisfy (27), (28) and (29).
4. Markets for physical capital, labor in eﬃciency units and the consumption good clear:
K =


































C +[ K − (1 − δ)K]+T + I − Ξ=F(K,L) (32)
where
C =






















5. The Aggregate Law of Motion is stationary:
Φ=H(Φ) (36)





p(sp), tra(sp,1), ed(sp,1), the Markov process Q(ηe,Ne) and the transmission matrix
Qinitial,e(i,i ∈ I = {1,2,...,n}) and can be written explicitly as
(a) For all sets (A,Ap,E,N e,J) with J = {2,...,30} such that (A,Ap,E,N,J) ∈S y,a,













Q(η,η ) if a 
y,a(sy,a) ∈A ,a  
p(sp) ∈A p,e = e  ∈E,j +1∈J
0 otherwise
Py,a(sy,a,(A,Ap,E,N e,J)) is the transition function. It gives the probability that
an agent with endowment sy,a at age j ends up in j+1 with asset holdings a 
y,a ∈A ,
productivity state η  ∈N e and parental asset holdings a 
p ∈A p. The education
level remains constant.
13(b) For all sets (A,E,N e,J) with J = {2,...,30} such that (A,E,N,J) ∈S y,d, the
measure of agents with deceased parents is given by
Φd =
   
Sy,d Py,d(sy,d,(A,E,N e,J))dΦd+
 





   
η ∈Ne
Q(η,η ) if a 
y,a(sy,a) ∈A ,e = e  ∈E,j +1∈J
0 otherwise
As fraction (1 − ψj+30) of parents dies in period j, Φd incorporates the measure
of young agents whose parents died in the previous period.
(c) For all sets (A,I,J) with J = {31} such that (A,I,J) ∈S p,1, the measure of
parent households in j =3 1is given by
Φp,1 =










   
i ∈I
Qinitial,e(i,i ) if a 
y,a(sy,a) ∈A ,j +1∈J
0 otherwise
and Pp,1(sy,d,(A,I,J)) follows straightforwardly.
Pp,1(.,(A,I,J)) shows the transition from child households to parent households.
The measure of parent households collects all child households.
(d) The measure of parent households while working is generated in a similar fashion.
(e) For all sets (A,Ap,E,N e,J) with J = {1} such that (A,Ap,E,N,J) ∈S y,a, the











p,1 (sp,1,(A,Ap,E,N e,J)) is given by a 
p,1(sp,1), tra(sp,1) and ed(sp,1)
where a 
p,1(sp,1) ∈A , tra(sp,1) ∈A p and ed(sp,1) ∈E.




A few remarks regarding the equilibrium conditions are in order. (30) and (31) state that
aggregate physical capital and labor measured in eﬃciency units follow from aggregating the
respective holdings of each agent and weighting them appropriately. (32) requires that the
good market clears, i.e. that the demand for goods, which is shown on the left-hand side,
14is equal to the supply of goods. The term [K − (1 − δ)K] on the left-hand side determines
the amount of investment that is necessary to keep the aggregate capital stock constant,
whereas I and T are aggregate college expenditures and transfers in stationary state, re-
spectively. (36) requires stationarity of the probability measure Φ. The function H is the
transition function which determines the probability that an agent will end up with a certain
combination of state variables tomorrow, given his endowment with state variables today.
Notice that the stationarity condition requires that child households are (on average) ’iden-
tical’ to their parents in the sense that they reproduce their parent household’s distribution
once they become parents themselves. This in turn implies that the distribution of transfers
and inheritances that child households receive is consistent with the distribution of transfers
that is actually left by parent households. I present more details about the computational
procedure in the appendix.
5 Parametrization and Calibration
I calibrate parameter values of the benchmark economy to represent relevant features of
the U.S. economy as closely as possible. It will be assumed that the length of one unit
of time in the model economy corresponds to a calendar year. The targets that I choose
for the benchmark economy describe the U.S. economy around 1980. I therefore label this
benchmark case ’economy 1980’. In order to compare the change of enrolment patterns over
time, I deﬁne a second steady-state which I denote as ’economy 2000’.
5.1 Economy 1980
5.1.1 Technology, Demographics and Preferences
I assume that the utility from consumption in each period is given by u(c)=c1−γ
1−γ . Production
is assumed to follow the aggregate production function F(K,L)=KαL1−α. I set the capital
share in income (α) equal to 0.36, as estimated by Prescott (1986). Following Imrohoroglu
et. al. (1995) and Heer (2001), I assume that capital depreciates at an annual rate of 8
percent. The conditional survival probability ψj is taken from the National Vital Statistics
Report, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2004) and refers to the conditional survival probability for the U.S.
population. Only values between age 53 and age 82 are used. I assume that the survival
probability is zero for agents at the age of 83. The survival probability for households
that are younger than 53 years is assumed to be equal to 1.9 The preference parameter γ
determines the relative risk aversion and is the inverse relation to the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. I follow Attanasio (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) who estimate
γ using consumption data and ﬁnd a value of 1.5. This value is well in the interval of 1 to 3
commonly used in the literature.
The two main parameters that govern the accumulation of wealth and transfer behavior -
the discount factor β and the intergenerational discount factor ς - are calibrated jointly such
9The actual survival probability before 53 is close to 1. See the National Vital Statistics Report.
15that the baseline economy is consistent with the wealth-income ratio and the relative size of
intergenerational transfers in the U.S. economy in 1980. Gale and Scholz (1994) compute a
ratio of inter vivos transfers to total wealth of 0.28 percent from the 1983 and 1986 Survey of
Consumer Finances. This number comprises ﬁnancial non-college support to children. The
resulting ς is 0.7, which implies that for the benchmark economy to be consistent with the
transfer ﬂows observable in the U.S. economy, a parent household would have to consider the
utility of a child household 30 percent less than it considers its own utility. This is in line
with results obtained from Nishiyama (2002) who uses an altruistic framework to explain
the observable degree of wealth inequality in U.S. economy.
5.1.2 Earnings Process
I assume that the process that governs the productivity shocks ηj,e follow an AR(1) process
with persistence parameter ρhs for high school graduates and ρcol for college graduates. The
variance of the innovations are σhs and σcol, respectively. These parameters are estimated by
Hubbard et al. (1995)(HSZ in the following) from the 1982 to 1986 Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). They ﬁnd that high school graduates have a lower earnings persistence
and a higher variance (ρhs =0 .946, σhs =0 .025) compared to college graduates (ρcol =0 .955,
σcol =0 .016). It should be noted that both estimates are rather conservative as HSZ use the
combined labor income of the husband and wife (if married) plus unemployment insurance for
their estimates. When I approximate the earnings process with a four-state Markov process
using the procedure proposed by Tauchen and Hussey (1991), I ﬁnd that the transition
matrices for high school and college graduates are nearly indistinguishable.
I also take the average age-eﬃciency proﬁle εe
j from HSZ, which gives us an estimate of
the college premium for diﬀerent age groups. The authors ﬁnd that earnings are more peaked
for college families, which is in line with ﬁndings from other empirical studies. Diﬀerent from
the model estimated by HSZ, we endogenize the college enrolment decision. This implies
that in equilibrium, college graduates are more likely to have positive deviations with the
respect to the average age proﬁle, because more productive children (measured in terms of
their ﬁrst draw from the productivity distribution) are more likely to attend college. This is
not reﬂected in the estimation of the mean age-earnings proﬁle of HSZ. I thus adjust the age
proﬁle for college graduates in the model downwards, such that the average college premium
after selection coincides in both models.
For the economy 1980, I also adjust their estimates for the earnings variance. The
reason is that HSZ estimate their model for the beginning of the 1980’s. Parents who decide
upon transfers in the beginning of the 1980’s accumulated their wealth in the 1970’s or
even earlier. Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1994) ﬁnd that the variance of both permanent and
transitory earnings increased by 40 percent between the two decades. For the economy 1980,
I thus use a σhs of 0.015 and σcol of 0.01.
165.1.3 College Completion and Cost of College
I assume that the probability of college completion λ(i) is an increasing function of the initial
productivity state i. In particular, I assume
λ(i)=d + a(i − 1) (41)
d,a ≥ 0
Recall that I approximate the AR(1) process with a 4-state Markov chain; I therefore have
a grid with 4 points that represent the diﬀerent productivity levels. Consequently, the
parameter d governs the completion probability for child households with low ability (i = 1).
d thus governs the expected return associated with college investment. I set d such that the
college participation rate of low ability students with parents in the highest income quartile
is 0.3. This is also the enrolment share of low-ability children from families in the highest
income quartile in the NLSY79 as reported by Belley and Lochner (2007).10 I use families
from the highest income quartile as a calibration target because ﬁnancial constraints are not
very likely to have an impact on their college enrolment decision (Carneiro and Heckman
(2002)). Instead, I impose that their decision is solely based on the expected return, which
is governed by d.F o rd =0 .32, the benchmark steady-state replicates the enrolment share of
high-income families with children of low ability. This implies that these students graduate
with a probability of 32 percent.
Two additional parameters inﬂuence the college investment behavior, the tuition costs
κ and the slope parameter a. I calibrate these parameters jointly such that the model is
consistent with an overall dropout probability of 50 percent (Restuccia and Urrutia (2004))
and a fraction of college graduates of 25 percent. I obtain a κ of 0.95 and an a of 0.07. In line
with U.S. evidence, the model implies that total college expenses are approximately equal to
per-capita GDP (see e.g. Collegeboard (2005) or Gallipoli et al. (2006)). A slope parameter
a of 0.07 implies that high-ability children have a 21 percent higher change of graduating
from college than low-ability children.
5.1.4 Transmission of Initial Productivity
In the data, there is a high degree of persistence in economic outcomes across generations.
Inheritability of genetic traits, the family environment and early education all matter for
explaining diﬀerent levels of pre-college ability levels Restuccia and Urrutia (2004). Follow-
ing Keane and Wolpin (2001), I assume that the transmission of initial productivity levels
depends solely on the level of parental education. Technically, I generate a positive link
by assuming that parents transmit part of their productivity shock at age j = 30 to their
children, who enter the economy when parents turn to j = 31.
10Belley and Lochner (2007) use the Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT) as a proxy for ability. AFQT
test scores are a widely used measure of cognitive achievement by social scientists using the NLSY and are
strongly correlated with positive outcomes like education and post-school earnings. See their footnote 2 for
further references
17Because transmission depends on parental education, I deﬁne two separate transition
matrices for parents with high school and college education, Qinitial,hs and Qinitial,col. Let
pcol
ip,ic∀{1,...,4} be an element of the transition matrix of college graduates. Then, pcol
ip,ic is
the probability that a college educated parent household of age j = 30 is of productivity ip,
while the child receives an initial productivity of ic. In order to achieve a positive link across
generations, it needs to be that pcol
ip,ic ≥ phs
ip,ic for ’high’ levels of ic and pcol
ip,ic ≤ phs
ip,ic for ’low’
levels ic. In addition, I require that pip,ic ≥ 0 to ensure that there are non-trivial percentages
in all productivity levels. Moreover, the probabilities in each row of the transition matrix
have to sum to 1,
 
ic pip,ic =1 .
Limited by these conditions, I model both transition matrices as linear combinations
between an identity matrix and a matrix which rows consist of an additive sequence. For
college graduates, this sequence has starting value 0, increment
(n−1)n
2 and n elements, where
n is the number of productivity shocks. Let π be the weight of this matrix and (1 − π)t h e
weight of the identity matrix. Then, pip,ic ≥ 0 requires π ∈ (0,1). π is calibrated such that
the model reproduces the correlation of college education across generations. Data from
NLSY 79 reported by Keane and Wolpin (2001), Table 4, suggests that this correlation is
between 0.28 and 0.38, depending on the youth’s level of completed schooling at age 16. The
correlation of education college attainment is signiﬁcantly weaker if I consider only parent-
child pairs for which the children’s schooling level at the age of 16 is similar. Since I do not
model diﬀerences pre-tertiary education, I choose π such that the model implies a correlation
of 0.31.
5.1.5 College Subsidies and Taxes
Parents who send their children to college receive a government subsidy ν|ed=1(ap,1,ε e
jηj,ew)
for each unit of expenditure in college education. The subsidy is a function of current income
and asset holdings. In the U.S., the calculation of the subsidy is based on an estimate of
the student’s family ability to pay the cost of college. This estimate is based on estimates
of ’discretionary income’ and ’available assets’ Feldstein (1995). I approximate discretionary
income as the sum of labor and capital income, net of taxes. Available assets are calculated
as the diﬀerence between current wealth holdings and a wealth level that is deemed to
maintain the current standard of living, which I approximate by the average asset holdings
in the economy, called a. These two measures are then combined by adding 12 percent of
the available net assets to the discretionary income, see Feldstein (1995).
The key point of the exercise is that every extra dollar of savings raises the amount of
available resources, which decreases the subsidy. Feldstein (1995) points out that this indirect
savings tax may generate strong disincentives for the accumulation of wealth. For simplicity
and because this speciﬁcation is common in the literature, I assume that the subsidy level
is linearly decreasing in the level of parental resources:




ν0,ν 1 ≥ 0
18I calibrate ν0 and ν1 such that (i) the ratio of college subsidies to total college expenses,
the subsidy rate, is 0.4, as reported by the OECD (see Akyol and Athreya (2005), Figure 1)
and (ii) the subsidy does not cover more than 50 percent of κ, the total college expenses an
individual household has to pay, see Keane and Wolpin (2001). This implies estimates of ν0
of 0.57 and of ν1 of 0.1. Following De Nardi (2004), I use a capital income tax rate τK of
0.2 and a replacement rate for pension beneﬁts of 0.4. Finally, I adjust the tax rate on labor
income τw such that the government budget (28) is balanced. This results in a tax rate of
15 percent. The results are summarized in Table 2.
5.2 Economy 2000
I adjust the average college premium, the earnings process and the tuition fees in order
to account for the increase in between-group inequality, within-group inequality and the
doubling of the college expenses (in real terms, see Collegeboard (2005)). All other parameter
values are left unchanged. The college premium increases by 30 percentage points (from 40
percent to 70 percent compared to our benchmark case (see Katz and Autor (1999)).
6 Results
In this section, I analyze the quantitative behavior of our benchmark economy. In particular,
I use my model as a measurement tool in order to evaluate to what extend borrowing
constraints are binding.
6.1 Economy 1980: How Important are Borrowing Constraints?
In this section, I show that the fraction of households that is borrowing constrained in their
college decision is 18 percent, which is substantially higher than what estimates from the
empirical literature suggest. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) ﬁnd that at most 8 percent of
the population are borrowing constrained in the short-run sense. I argue that the diﬀerence
is due to the measurement of long-term factors and the fact that parents are imperfectly
altruistic. If I apply their methodology to the data generated by the model, my results are
broadly consistent with their ﬁndings.
6.1.1 The Fraction of Constrained Households
In order to measure the fraction of constrained young households, I start with an experiment
in which I allow parents to borrow up the total college expenses. I implement the loan as a
transfer from the government to all parents before they decide on how much to invest in their
children. In order to keep its budget balanced, the government in turn collects the resources
from the child households. The debt contract takes the form of a redeemable loan, for which
the annual redemption sum is ﬁxed and independent of the child household’s income.
Now, I ’force’ parents to use the loan for their children, either in form of ﬁnancial transfers
or in form of college investment or both. Parents cannot use the additional resources for their
19own consumption. It is important to notice that this experiment is equivalent to a scenario
where the child households are oﬀered a loan directly, and where they decide themselves
whether they want to invest in human capital or in ﬁnancial assets.11 If the total loan
amount is transferred in form of ﬁnancial assets, the net present value of the loan is zero by
construction.12
I ﬁnd that the second experiment raises the total college enrolment rate to 75 percent, an
increase of 18 percentage points relative to the benchmark economy. From this it follows that
the presence of borrowing constraints for college education is associated with a decrease in
the college enrolment rates of 18 percent relative to an economy where enrolment is dictated
solely by the expected value of going to college. This result exceeds the ﬁndings from the
empirical literature considerably. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) conclude that the fraction
of constrained households in the population is at most 8 percent. In the next two sections, I
shed further light on the diﬀerence between my results and theirs. I show that once I apply
their methodology to the data generated by my model, the results broadly coincide.
6.1.2 Enrolment Gap
I now examine how the model compares to the data as regards to enrolment gaps between
income groups. For the 1980 economy, I compute the college enrolment rate by family income
and ability level. Figure 3 plots the results.
The empirical counterpart is taken from Belley and Lochner (2007), Figure 2a, who study
data from the NLSY79. Figure 4 shows their results. I ﬁnd that - both in the model and in
the data - college enrolment increases with ability level. In the model, this is an immediate
consequence of the assumption that more able children have a higher likelihood to graduate
from college, which makes college investment more proﬁtable for their parents.
These plots also indicate a subsidiary, but quantitatively important role for family income
in accounting for college entry, which one might think of as indicating the importance of
borrowing constraints. In an inﬂuential paper, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) claim that
enrolment gaps with respect to family income are not very informative about the strength
of borrowing constraints. They argue that one needs to distinguish between short-term
borrowing constraints, which are created by short-term cash-ﬂow problems when a child
is on the threshold of college enrolment, and long-term borrowing constraints related to
a family’s ability to ﬁnance education through a youth’s childhood. Only the short-term
constraints are of relevance for public policy in my framework, as they can be addressed
directly with policy measures such as a diﬀerent college subsidy scheme. Family income,
which is measured when the child is on the threshold of college entry, thus captures short-
term as well as long-term constraints.
Carneiro and Heckman control for long-term factors by including parental education
and a set of other family related variables in addition to a measure of academic ability when
11Because parents choose the optimal mix between ﬁnancial transfers and college investment such that
they maximize their own utility and their children’s utility is part of their total utility, the parental decision
about the optimal division of the loan coincides with the decision the oﬀspring would take.
12I expect that low-ability children receive a greater share of the loan in terms of ﬁnancial transfers.
20computing the enrolment gaps. They ﬁnd that gaps in college entry by family income narrow
signiﬁcantly after controlling for long-run borrowing constraints (see Figure 5 in their paper).
In Table 5, I report the enrolment gaps with respect to the highest income quartile
generated by the baseline economy. Each column represents a diﬀerent ability quartile.
Panel A of Table 5 documents the enrolment gaps corresponding to Figure 3. Panel B and
C give the enrolment gaps after controlling for the parental education level (high school or
college, respectively).
In line with Carneiro and Heckman (2002), I ﬁnd that enrolment gaps narrow after
controlling for long-term factors, in my case ability and parental schooling. Table 5 reveals
that enrolment gaps for children from college graduated parents diﬀer very little across
diﬀerent income groups.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) interpret these enrolment gaps as the fraction of the pop-
ulation that cannot attend college because of ﬁnancial constraints. They conclude that at
most 8 percent of the population is constrained in their college decision. I repeat their anal-
ysis and weight the enrolment gaps documented in Table 5 with the fraction of the total
population in the respective ability and income quartile. I ﬁnd that the maximum fraction
constrained is 14 percent if I condition on high school education (Panel B) and 11 percent if
I control for college education (Panel C). Without controlling for education, the estimated
share would have been considerably higher (20 percent, panel A) which conﬁrms that incor-
porating long-term factors decreases the conjectured role of borrowing constraints, as argued
by Carneiro and Heckman (2002).
Above I argued that removing the borrowing constraint for college enrolment leads to
an 18 increase in the enrolment rate. Thus, the model-based estimate of the extent to
which borrowing constraints adversely aﬀect college entry is substantially higher than the
econometric estimate derived from controlling for long-term factors. I will now show that
this disparity is due to imperfect altruism on the part of parental households which implies
that young and able households may receive insuﬃcient transfers even if their parents could
aﬀord to send them to college.
6.1.3 The Role of Imperfect Altruism
In order to gauge the importance of imperfect altruism, I repeat the experiment from Sec-
tion 6.1.1 but let parents decide how to spend the additional resources provided by the
government. Thus, comparing this experiment to the ’forced’ experiment reported in Table
4, allows me to check how imperfect altruism aﬀects the extent of borrowing constraints for
prospective college entrants. I will refer to this experiment as ’free disposal’. The fact that
parents are imperfectly altruistic implies that parents weight the disutility the child suﬀers
from repaying the loan less than their utility gain they obtain by using part of the loan for
their own consumption purposes. I thus expect that parents do not provide the total loan
amount to their children.13 The ’free disposal’ experiment therefore mainly illustrates the
13Because of imperfect capital markets, parents might also be borrowing constrained for their own con-
sumption purposes. Since parents are already in an advanced stage of the life cycle when transfers take
place, I do not expect constraints on parental consumption to be binding for a larger fraction of families.
21extend to which imperfect altruism biases our measured fraction of constrained families.
Table 4 reports the total share of students that engage in college education. I ﬁnd that
the fraction of college students in each cohort increase from 57 percent to 62 percent when I
allow for borrowing. Compared to the increase of 18 percent that one could observe in the
’forced’ experiment above, this share appears to be relatively small.
In order to understand the diﬀerences, it is interesting to compare the Figures 3, 5
and 6. I ﬁnd that in the experiment with ’forced’ credit (Figure 6), the enrolment rates
increase not only for households from the lower end of the income distribution, but also
for rich households. I do not observe this pattern in the ’free-disposal’ experiment (Figure
5), which suggest that enrolment rates rise because the ’forced’ experiment eliminates all
eﬀects of imperfect altruism. Hence, ignoring the possibility of imperfect altruism may bias
the estimated fraction of constrained households downwards. The results show that, even
though the average enrolment gap measured in the model is in line with empirical results
by Carneiro and Heckman (2002), the true fraction of constrained households is much larger
as even children from high-income family may not receive the suﬃcient amount of transfers
needed to go to college.
6.1.4 The Role of Parental Education as a Long-Run Factor
Conditioning on parental education has a signiﬁcant impact on observable enrolment pat-
terns, implying that there is a strong link between parental education and children’s college
attendance. Apart from the fact that college graduated parents are richer, they also have,
by assumption, smarter children.
However, Table 6 documents that even after controlling for ability and family income
quartile, oﬀspring from college educated families have a 4.7 percent higher change of being
enrolled in college than descendants from high school educated families (Table 6, ﬁrst row).
This diﬀerence stems from the fact that education not only determines the level of family
income but also the level of parental wealth. In the empirical literature, family income is
usually solely observed in a speciﬁc year. Wealth in turn is determined by permanent income,
which may only be weakly related to the level of income around college age.
The second row of Table 6 accounts for this eﬀect. Here, I compute the average diﬀerence
between the enrolment rates of college graduates and high school graduates, controlling for
the quartile of family income, ability and assets. The results of the ﬁrst and the second
row are extremely similar, suggesting that diﬀerences in asset holdings - after controlling for
family income - do not explain the gap in college enrolment between children of diﬀerently
educated parents.
The ﬁndings contribute to the debate in the literature on whether parental education
should be used as a measure for long-term borrowing constraints (Carneiro and Heckman
(2002), Kane (2006)). To the extent that parents can help ﬁnancing their children’s education
with current income or accumulated assets, conditioning on parental education may lead to
an understatement of the role of short-term constraints (Kane 2006, p. 1394). The results
suggest that this is not the case; parental education seems to have an inﬂuence on college
going, which is independent of the wealth eﬀect.
22Neither diﬀerences in parental endowment nor diﬀerences in children’s ability explain
fully why high school educated parents provide less support for their oﬀspring’s college
education. Instead, the diﬀerences stem from diﬀerent expectations about the future. High
school graduates are exposed to a higher earnings risk and lower average earnings, even after
the time their children left home. Indeed, I ﬁnd that high school graduates have higher
savings than college graduates at age 53, the age at which parent households decide about
transfers.
In Tables 7 and 8, I compute average savings for diﬀerent ability, income and wealth
quartiles, diﬀerentiated by the education level of the household. The results convey a clear
message: high school graduates at age 53 tend to save more than college graduates at this
age.
Thus, in conclusion, I ﬁnd that large fraction of borrowing constrained households mea-
sured in my model compared to the literature can be explained by (i) the fact that parents
are imperfectly altruistic, which implies that even children from high-income families may
not receive enough parental funding and (ii) the high school educated parents save more and
transfer less than their college educated counterparts, even if their children are equally well
prepared for college.
6.2 Economy 2000: Have borrowing constraints become more lim-
iting?
6.2.1 Have Borrowing Constraints Become more Limiting?
In order to analyze to what extent borrowing constraints have become more binding as the
economic environment changed between 1980 and 2000, I repeat the ’free-disposal’ as well as
the ’forced’ experiment for the 2000 economy. The ’free-disposal’ experiment for the economy
2000 indicates that the share of college students increases from 60 percent to 85 percent,
which is a change of 25 percentage points (see Table 4). This result is in stark contrast to
the result for the economy 1980, for which enrolment increased by only 5 percentage points.
Comparison of the college enrolment rates for the tow diﬀerent economies, see Figures
5 and 9 reveals that the low-ability students make the diﬀerence. While these agents’ col-
lege enrolment decisions are approximately unaﬀected by the provision of loans in the 1980
economy, this policy increases their enrolment rates signiﬁcantly in the 2000 economy. This
indicates that – due to the increase in the college premium – college education becomes more
proﬁtable for this group of students. As indicated by the enrolment patterns in the previous
section, only rich parents are willing to take advantage of this and invest in their low-ability
children. Despite the surge in the college premium, parents with lower income, instead, do
not ﬁnd it advantageous to transfer suﬃcient funds to their oﬀspring.
Applying the ’forced’ credit experiment to the economy 2000 reveals the full extent to
which lack of parental transfers (and thus borrowing constraints) limit college enrolment.
In this alternative experiment, enrolment goes up to approximately 100 percent. That is,
around 40 percent of the population are constrained in their college decision, compared to
2318 percent in the economy 1980.14
Thus, the recent changes in the economic environment in the U.S. generate a larger
fraction of constrained households. In order to understand why, I present the changes in the
enrolment patterns between 1980 and 2000 in the next section.
6.2.2 Enrolment Rates
I now analyze to what extend the increase in the college premium, the tuition fees and the
variance of the productivity process have aﬀected the college enrolment for diﬀerent ability
and family income quartiles. Figure 7 shows the enrolment rates obtained from our model
economy 2000, while the empirical counterpart from the NLSY97 is displayed in Figure 8
(see Belley and Lochner (2007), Figure 2b). In line with their observations, I ﬁnd that the
role of ability did not change with respect to the economy 1980. Also consistent with the
data, there are two striking diﬀerences between the economies of 1980 and 2000:
1. Enrolment rates are higher for the economy 2000. This suggests that in the aggregate,
the rise in the rate of return on tertiary education more than outweighs the increase
in risk and the higher price of tuition.
2. Enrolment gaps between diﬀerent family income groups have widened over time, in
particular for the low-ability students. This holds even after controlling for parental
education (see Table 10).
To better understand the increase in the enrolment gap for low-ability students, I compute
the share of college students from the lowest ability for the economy 1980 and the economy
2000. I ﬁnd that this fraction has more than doubled from 1.8 percent to 5 percent (see Table
4). This increase could indicate that the number of high income families with low ability
children rose since high income families are more prone to send their oﬀspring to college.
However, our results reveal that the number of families from the top income quartile that
have children with low ability actually declined from 2.4t o1 .3 percent. Consequently, the
rise of the fraction of low-ability college students must be due to the increase in the college
premium which made college investment more attractive, even for low-ability students.
Next, I compute the average savings for diﬀerent income, wealth and ability quartiles,
using the policy functions and the steady-state distribution of agents generated by our econ-
omy 2000 for agents at age 53. The results are shown in Tables 10 and 11. If I compare
the diﬀerence between high school and college graduates for 1980 (tables 7 and 8) with the
diﬀerences in 2000, I ﬁnd that high school graduated parents now save even more compared
to their college graduated counterparts, all other things equal. The increase appears to be
more pronounced for parents with children in the lowest ability quartile.
14It is also interesting to note that the model implies that the share of students who drop out from college
without a degree increased, albeit only slightly, when one compares the baseline economy to the economy
2000. This rise is an immediate consequence of the fact that the share of low-ability students increased.
The ﬁndings thus provide an explanation for the changing dynamic between college enrolment and college
completion, which is documented by Turner (2004). See Table 4
24Strikingly, savings of high school graduates relative to college graduates increases, after
controlling income and wealth. This is due to the increase in the variance of earnings shocks,
which I use in order to simulate the increment in the within-group inequality. This rise in
uncertainty has a stronger impact on high school graduates, as labor earnings comprise a
bigger share of total income for that group. Therefore, the need for precautionary savings is
higher for the high school group, which causes them to keep more resources to secure their
own future. This result is reinforced by the fact that high school graduated parents are
more likely to have low-ability children, which reduces the expected return from investing.
In addition, the rise in tuition fees has made college expenses even more expensive, reducing
the incentives for the poor to invest in their children.
In conclusion, I ﬁnd that the recent changes in the economic environment generate a
stronger link between family income and college enrolment in the model, which is in line
with the data. The model predict that ﬁnancial constraint have become more limiting over
the course of time. In the model, this stems from the fact that the rise in the college
premium implies that more young household are willing to go to college. Only the rich
parents, however, can take advantage of this and invest. The others are hampered by the
increase in within-group inequality, which requires more savings for their own future, and
the increment of the tuition fees.
6.3 Testable Implications
A key insight from the analysis above is that, according to my model, parents at age 53 with
high school education save more and transfer less to their oﬀspring than college graduates
at the same age. I will now examine to empirical relevance of this aspect of my analysis.
I address this issue by computing education speciﬁc savings and transfers from the 1986
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
6.3.1 The Trade-Oﬀ between Transfers and Savings in the Data
The SCF is a household survey conducted on a triennial basis. It consists of a cross-section
of U.S. households, with the exception of the waves in 1983 and 1986 which contain re-
peated cross-sections. This allows me to observe household savings between 1983 and 1986.
Moreover, the 1986 wave also ask extensively about household’s transfer behavior, and has
therefore become a standard reference with respect to parental inter-vivos transfers (see e.g.
Gale and Scholz (1994)). I compute total transfers given by a household as the sum of all
monetary transfers and college expenses, which are reported separately in the SCF.15 I use
savings in constant prices accumulated between 1983 and 1986. In order to be consistent
with the model, I only consider those households that are between 45 and 65 years old,
and that have at least one child. As Table 12 shows, college graduates have on average
higher savings and transfer more resources (column 1), as one would expect from the fact
that college graduates are on average more aﬄuent and have higher income than high school
15The 1986 SCF only reports transfers if the transfer amount is above 3000 US-Dollar.
25graduates. However, if I introduce dummies for the asset quartile and the income quartile
in order to control for wealth and income eﬀects, I ﬁnd that college graduates make more
transfers, but they save considerably less than high school educated parents.16 In line with
the predictions of the model, this suggests that there is trade-oﬀ between savings and trans-
fers, and that the split between the two is also determined by expectations about the future.
This ﬁnding has important implications for the design of college subsidy rules. Dynarski
and Scott-Clayton (2006) and Kane (2006) argue that part of the enrolment gap can be
explained by the complexity of existing system of distributing federal student aid, which dis-
proportionately burdens youth from low-income and low-education families. They propose
to implement simple, easily communicable aid programs. My results extend their argument:
because ﬁnancial aid is determined solely on the basis of actual family wealth and income,
it adversely aﬀects students from low-income families. Instead, college aid should also be
based on expected future earnings.
6.3.2 The Drop in the Degree of Education Persistence
Another model implication that deserves further attention can be seen in Table 4. In the last
column, I document the intergenerational correlation of educational attainment for the dif-
ferent economies. Interestingly, the results indicate that the degree of education persistence
decreased as one moves from the economy 1980 to the economy 2000. This is perhaps sur-
prising as the literature generally assumes that borrowing constraints lead to a higher degree
of persistence, not the other way round (see Keane and Wolpin (2001), among others).
The fact that the link between parents and children in educational achievement weakened
over time can also be seen from Table 6. Comparing the ﬁrst and the second column, one
ﬁnds that the role of parental education in predicting college entry declined over time, after
controlling for ability, parental wealth and income. This is in line with recent empirical
evidence. Both Ellwood and Kane (2000) and Belley and Lochner (2007), Table 3, show
that the correlation of parental education and children’s college attendance declined over
time. They also include a proxy for academic ability in the regression, and control for the
parental wealth and income quartile.
The decrease in the role of parental education in predicting college access stems from the
fact that more high school educated parents are among the group that are able to aﬀord to
send their children to college. While the fraction of high school graduated parents that were
either in the top three income quartiles and in the top three wealth quartiles of all parents
was 53 percent in 1980, this fraction increased to 56 percent in 2000. This eﬀect must be
due to the increase in the instability of earnings, which raises wealth inequality among high
school graduates.
This shows that the rise in precautionary savings can simultaneously explain the increase
in the number of constrained households and the decline in the degree of the intergenerational
persistence of education. On the one hand, precautionary savings decrease the willingness
of parents to transfer resources to their oﬀspring, leading to a greater fraction of constrained
16The 1986 SCF does not include any measure for the academic ability of the oﬀspring. However, one can
show that the key predictions of Tables 7 and 8, still holds, even if one controls only for income and wealth
26children. On the other hand, the increment in savings throughout the life cycle increases the
fraction of high school graduated parents that possesses the necessary amount of resources
to invest, which weakens the intergenerational correlation of education.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to shed more light on the role of borrowing constraints in determining
college enrolment. I also address the question to what extend the quantitative importance of
borrowing constraints has changed over time. I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model
with overlapping generations, in which households are organized into dynasties. Because of
market incompleteness, borrowing against future earnings is not possible, which allows me to
measure the fraction of households constrained in their college decision. Young households
need to rely on parental transfers and public subsidies if they wish to attend college. A key
feature is the assumption that parents provide transfers to their children because of altruism,
that is, they consider their children’s utility in their own maximization problem.
I calibrate the model such that it is consistent with key parameters of the U.S. economy.
Once I increase the college premium, the tuition fees and the earnings inequality in order to
simulate changes in the economic environment that occurred between 1980 and 2000, I ﬁnd
that the model is consistent with a rise in the enrolment gaps by levels of family income that
are observed in the U.S. data (Belley and Lochner (2007)).
The assumption of one-sided altruism implies that parents face a trade-oﬀ between mak-
ing transfers and saving resources for future consumption, since the parent households have
no access to the future returns of the college investment. I ﬁnd that the transfer ﬂows gen-
erated by the model imply that parents are imperfectly altruistic. That is, parents weight
their children’s utility less than their own. From the point of view of a parent household,
this lowers the expected return from investing in their children’s education. I ﬁnd that even
youth with rich parents may thus be constrained in their college going decision.
The model also predicts that - all other things equal - high school educated parents
transfer less to their children and save more for their own future consumption than college
educated parents. In the model, this is due to the fact that high school graduates foresee
lower future earnings and higher uncertainty about the actual realization of the earnings
process than college graduates. This forces them to save more to secure their own future
consumption. I test this prediction using transfer and savings data from the 1986 Survey of
Consumer Finances. The results support the predictions of the model: high school graduates
transfer less and save more than their college educated counterparts, after controlling for
wealth and income.
The model is in line with the fact that parents and children make distinct choices regard-
ing children’s schooling may lead to substantial downward biases in estimating the fraction
of borrowing constrained household. The model predicts that in 1980, before the economic
changes occurred, around 18 percent of all households are ﬁnancially constrained in their
college decision. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence based on the NLSY79, which
ﬁnds that the fraction of constrained households is at most 8 percent (Carneiro and Heckman
27(2002)). My results show that narrow enrolment gaps (after controlling for long-term factors)
are consistent with a large fraction of households constrained in their college decision.
The model further predicts that the share of families that are ﬁnancially constrained in
their college decision has risen dramatically over time. I document that this stems from
the fact that the proﬁtability of college education for low-ability students increased, but
their parental willingness to provide resources did not keep pace with that. Parents with
lower education levels, who are more severely aﬀected by the increase in the within-group
inequality, need more resources to secure their own future and are therefore not willing to
provide more ﬁnancial assistance. Again, this result stresses the importance of considering
the determinants of parental transfers for analyzing college enrolment patterns.
The results of this paper have important implications for the design of college subsidies.
First of all, the ﬁndings suggest that the parental decision to transfer funds necessary for
college attendance are not only the current level of family resources but are also based on
expectations about the future. This implies that college subsidy rules should not only rely
on current information but also consider future events. While it might be diﬃcult to predict
the future income stream, the computation of public funding should at least incorporate
future expenditures that are already predictable. For example, families that expect to send
more than one child to college in the near future should receive more subsidies already for
the ﬁrst child. According to the trade-oﬀ described in the model, households anticipate
the future expenditure and provide fewer resources already to the ﬁrst child. Well-designed
college subsidies have to compensate for that.
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318 Appendix: Solution Algorithm
I solve the quantitative model using a nested ﬁxed point algorithm with a successive approx-
imation to the value function at its center. The outer loop searches for a ﬁxed point in the
interest rate, while the inner loop solves the dynamic program given by (6) - (16) using suc-
cessive approximation to the value function. Notice that the inner loop is necessary because
the hybrid model nests both the pure life cycle economy and a model with inﬁnitely lived
dynasties as special cases: the parental value function (21) contains the discounted future
utility of the child and vice versa. I start with a guess for the parental value function, V  
p,1,
solve the child’s problem (9), giving V  
p,1 and compute an update for (21),V   
p,1. I continue
iterating over (21)until convergence is achieved.
8.1 Approximating the Value Function
The model economy contains up to two continuous state variables, namely own assets and
parents assets, the latter only if parents are alive. 17 Approximating the value function by
means of discretization thus proves to be infeasible. Instead, I compute a linear approxima-
tion to the value function. I start with a discrete approximation D to the continuum of all
possible asset holdings, {d1,d2,...dm}≡D. The value function is computed at all di ∈ D. By
means of a simple grid search, I pick that element that gives the highest value of the value
function, which I call di∗. The maximum is bracketed by di∗−1 and di∗+1. To compute the
optimal savings decision, I perform a golden section search on the interval spanned by the
two boundary values. In-between values are computed by linear interpolation using di∗−1,
di∗+1 and di∗. For young agents with living parents, I span a two dimensional grid and use
bi-linear interpolation.
This procedure has the advantage that is does not require the value function to be
diﬀerentiable. Non-diﬀerentiabilities may arise because college investment is discretionary.
In model period j = 31, only parents who are rich enough invest in their oﬀspring’s education,
which induces a kink in the parental value function. This may also lead to convex parts in
the curvature of the value function. Concavity, however, is a necessary prerequisite for the
golden section search, which guarantees that the procedure actually picks a global maximum.
We achieve convexiﬁcation by making the process of college skill accumulation probabilis-
tic. In addition, parents do not only use education investment but also ﬁnancial transfers in
order to transfer resources across generations. Because ﬁnancial transfers are perfectly divis-
ible, they contribute to convexifying the parental value function. Intuitively, the divisibility
of ﬁnancial transfers allows parents to balance the total amount of resources transferred to
the child. If college investment becomes proﬁtable from a certain wealth level onwards, ﬁ-
nancial transfers are reduced, which causes the value function to increase only slightly. This
helps to smooth out the kink introduced by the discrete nature of college investments.
The same argument applies to the savings of a parent household in model period j = 31.
Parental savings increment parental wealth holdings, which are part of the child household’s
17Since we approximate the income process with a Markov chain, all other state variables are discrete.
32Figure 2: Interpolated value function for diﬀerent levels of household wealth, after controlling
for education, productivity and children’s ability shock
state space. Because parents decide about savings, monetary transfers and college investment
simultaneously given their budget constraint in j = 31, investing in college thus reduces their
savings and decreases the child households utility.
In total, when computing the approximation to the value function, I ﬁnd that appears
to be concave, as graph 2 shows. 18
Since the state space involves two continuous variables for the case of agents with living
parents, this procedure requires a bilinear interpolation. While linear interpolation is shape
preserving, bilinear interpolation is generally not, as outlined in Judd (1998), Ch. 6. In order
to avoid potential drawbacks of using an interpolation scheme which is not shape preserving,
I use the fact that one of the continuous state variables is exogenously given. That is, when
the policy functions for young agents are computed, their parental capital stock is ﬁxed,
and I compute a 
j(a1,ap,..),a  
j(a2,ap,..),..., by iterating over the capital grid. This implies
that while computing the maximum, I only interpolate in one dimension and the problem
remains concave. In order to save computation time, I exploit the fact that the value function
is monotone increasing function of assets.
18This is not due to the approximation procedure, as linear interpolation is shape preserving.
338.2 Computation of the Equilibrium
Using the policy functions which were computed previously, I can now solve for the equilib-
rium allocation. Computing an equilibrium involves the following steps:
1. Choose the policy parameters, that is, determine the social security replacement rate
rep, the tax rate for capital income τk and a college subsidy rule ν.
2. Provide an initial guess for the aggregate (physical) capital stock K0, the aggregate
human capital stock H0 and the labor tax rate τw. Given the guesses for K and H, use
the ﬁrst-order conditions from the ﬁrms problem to obtain the relative factor prices r
and w.
3. Compute the optimal decision rules as outlined in the previous section.
4. Compute the time invariant measure Φ of agents over the state space.
5. Compute the aggregate asset holdings K1 and the new human capital stock L1 using
(30) and (31). Given K1 and L1, update r, w and τw.







< 10−3 stop; otherwise return to step 2 and replace K0
with K1 and L0 with L1.
In step 4, I ﬁnd the time-invariant measure of agents Φ by iterating on the aggregate
law of motion as deﬁned in (36), as it is commonly done in models with an inﬁnite time
horizon. In the model, the measure of parents in their ﬁst period of adulthood depends on
the transition of children (because all parents were children one period before). In turn,
the measure of children in their ﬁrst period of life depends on the measure of their parents
(because children receive transfers and education). Stationarity requires that the probability
measure is constant over time. This implies that, for a given measure of parents, the measure
of children exactly reproduces the measure of their own parents.
I approximate the measure of agents by means of a probability density function. 19 The
density function is computed and stored on a ﬁnite set of grid points. Following R´ ıos-Rull
and of Minneapolis Research Dept (1997), I choose a grid Ddensity which is ﬁner than the one
used in the previous step for computing the decision rules, that is D ⊆ Ddensity. Choosing
a ﬁner grid for the density increases the precision with which the aggregate variables are
computed, since the optimal asset choices are continuous.20 Thus, the optimal choice will
19Heer and Maußner (2005) argue that approximating the time-invariant measure of agents with the help
of a density function saves up to 40 percent of the CPU time with respect to an approximation using the
distribution. This is because computing the distribution function requires to compute the inverse of the
policy function.
20The gains in precision (as measured by aggregate excess demand) by doing so are enormous. The reason
is that the aggregate good market clearing condition is just a weighted average of the individuals’ budget
constraints, where the weights are derived from the grid points of the density Φ. The ﬁner the grid in Φ, the
better will be the correspondence between the optimal policies and the resulting weights, leading to better
aggregation results.
34almost surely be oﬀ-grid. In order to map the optimal choices onto the grid, we introduce
some kind of lottery. An individual with asset choice a (.) ∈ (ai,a i+1) is interpreted as
choosing asset holdings ai with probability λ and asset holdings ai+1 with probability (1−λ)
where λ solves a (.)=λai +( 1− λ)ai+1. No lottery is needed for agents for which the
lower bounds on asset holdings is binding, which is the case for a positive fraction of the
population. I thus allocate the grid points such that there closer mashed in the neighborhood
of the lower bound. This is achieved by choosing a grid points which are equally spaced in
logarithms. I select the upper bound of Ddensity and D such that it is never found to be
binding.
I ﬁnd the time invariant measure of agents Φ by iterating on the aggregate law of motion
as deﬁned in (36). Φ is is only stored on a ﬁnite grid, an individual with choice a (.)
∈ (ai,a i+1) is interpreted to choose asset holdings ki with probability λ and asset holdings
ki+1 with probability (1 − λ) where λ solves a (.)=λai +( 1− λ)ai+1. That is, we compute
a piecewise linear approximation to the density function.
The forward recursion starts with an initial distribution of young agents in model period
j =1 , Φ1(A×Pr×Ap×E×{1}). This requires an initial guess for the distribution of parents
in model period j = 31. Using decision rule, one can then derive Φ1(A×Pr ×Ap×E ×{1}).
In stationary equilibrium, this distribution needs to be identical with Φ31(A × Pr ×{ j =
31}), the distribution of agents in model period j = 36. Following Heer (2001), a uniform
distribution is taken as an initial guess for Φ31(A × Pr ×{ j =3 1 }). The age-independent
time-invariant distribution is computed using the decision rules derived from (6)-(16), where
Φ31(A × Pr ×{ j =3 1 }) is updated until convergence.
As a check on the internal consistency, aggregate consumption, investment, transfers and
output are computed in order to ensure that the good market clearing condition (32) is
approximately satisﬁed.21
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Figure 3: Enrolment Rates 1980
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Figure 7: Enrolment Rates 2000
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Figure 10: Enrolment Rates Economy 2000, children borrow.
10 Appendix: Tables
Parameter Description Value
α capital share of income 0.36
δ capital depreciation rate 0.08
γ risk aversion 1.5
ρhs earnings persistence high school 0.946
σhs variance shocks 0.015
ρcol earnings persistence college 0.955
σcol variance shocks 0.010
τK capital income tax rate 0.2
rep replacement ratio pensions 0.4
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters with Direct Empirical Counterpart for ’Economy 1980’
40Parameter Description Value Target Target Value
β discount factor 0.963 Wealth/Income 3.0
κ cost of college 0.94 % coll. graduates 25















τw labor income tax 0.15 budget balanced –
ς intergen. discounting 0.7 ﬁnancial transfers/wealth 0.028
ν0 upper bound coll. subsidy 0.57 upper bound in data 0.5
ν1 slope coll. subsidy 0.1 coll. subsidies/coll. expenses 0.4
Table 2: Parameters Without Direct Empirical Counterpart
Parameter Description Value 1980 2000
σhs variance shocks 0.015 0.025
σcol variance earnings shocks 0.01 0.016
κ cost of college 0.94 2.13
Table 3: Parameters characterizing the Economy 2000
Table 4: Enrolment Characteristics for Diﬀerent Economies
Economy % enrolled % drop out % low ability % corr. edu
1980 57 55 1.8 0.30
’free-disposal’ 62 55 1.3 0.28
’forced’ 75 56 8 0.22
2000 60 56 5 0.28
’free disposal’ 85 57 16 0.18
’forced’ 99 58 25 0.10
Notes: The Table shows the total enrolment rate, the total drop-out rate, the
fraction of college students from the lowest ability quartile, and the intergenerational
persistence of college education
41Table 5: Enrolment Gaps with Respect to the Top Income Quartile for Diﬀerent Ability
Quartiles, Economy 1980
Ability Quart. 1 Ability Quart. 2 Ability Quart. 3 Ability Quart. 4
Panel A – All Parents
income 4-1 0.29 0.61 0.55 0.28
income 4-2 0.29 0.33 0.09 0.005
income 4-3 0.24 0.22 0.003 0
Panel B – High School Educated Parents
income 4-1 0.23 0.45 0.54 0.28
income 4-2 0.23 0.18 0.1 0.007
income 4-3 0.18 0.09 0.002 -0.002
Panel C – College Educated Parents
income 4-1 – – – –
income 4-2 0.86 0.06 -0.002 0
income 4-3 0.79 0.06 0 0
Notes: Enrolment gaps are computed for diﬀerent ability quartiles, without controlling for parental
education (panel A), only for children with high-school graduates parents (panel B) and for children
with college graduated parents (panel C). An entry for ’income 4-1’ of 0.29 indicates that the enrolment
rate in the lowest income quartile is about 30 percentage points below the enrolment rate of the highest
income quartile. A missing entry (–) indicates that there are no children with parents in this category.
Table 6: Diﬀerence in College Enrolment Rates of College Graduated Parents vs. High School
Graduated Parents
Economy 1980 Economy 2000
(a) 4.5 2.3
(b) 4.3 2
Notes: In (a), I control for the ability and income quartile
and in (b) for ability, income and the wealth quartile. A
value of ’4.5’ indicates that within this group, children
with college educated parents are 4.5 percent more likely
to enrol in college than youth from high school educated
families.
42Table 7: Economy 1980: Average savings of high school graduates (model period j =3 1 ),
controlling for their wealth and income quartile, and the ability quartile of their children.
Ability 1 Ability 2 Ability 3 Ability 4
Wealth 1 Income 1 1.66 1.59 1.50 1.43
Income 2 2.0 1.90 1.69 1.61
Income 3 2.27 2.17 2.08 2.08
Income 4 ----
Wealth 2 Income 1 3.19 3.09 2.92 2.77
Income 2 3.51 3.27 3.05 3.05
Income 3 3.43 3.43 3.43 3.43
Income 4 ----
Wealth 3 Income 1 4.63 4.63 4.51 4.27
Income 2 4.51 4.29 4.08 4.08
Income 3 4.97 4.85 4.80 4.92
Income 4 ----
Wealth 4 Income 1 5.20 5.20 5.20 5.20
Income 2 6.55 6.55 6.56 6.57
Income 3 6.94 6.87 6.88 7.05
Income 4 8.69 8.65 8.72 9.01
Table 8: Economy 1980: Average savings of college graduates (model period j =3 1 ), con-
trolling for their wealth and income quartile, and the ability quartile of their children.
Ability 1 Ability 2 Ability 3 Ability 4
Wealth 1 Income 1 ----
Income 2 1.81 1.52 1.50 1.50
Income 3 2.01 1.94 1.93 1.93
Income 4 2.09 2.16 2.19 2.20
Wealth 2 Income 1 ----
Income 2 2.62 2.28 2.26 2.26
Income 3 3.23 2.95 3.02 3.07
Income 4 2.53 3.11 3.39 3.52
Wealth 3 Income 1 ----
Income 2 ----
Income 3 4.33 4.27 4.26 4.26
Income 4 3.69 4.27 4.53 4.85
Wealth 4 Income 1 ----
Income 2 ----
Income 3 5.53 5.53 5.77 5.90
Income 4 7.06 7.22 7.50 8.10
43Table 9: Enrolment Gaps with Respect to the Top Income Quartile for Diﬀerent Ability
Quartiles, Economy 2000
Ability Quart. 1 Ability Quart. 2 Ability Quart. 3 Ability Quart. 4
Panel A – All Parents
income 4-1 0.78 0.81 0.61 0.36
income 4-2 0.67 0.45 0.09 0.03
income 4-3 0.59 0.33 0.01 0
Panel B – High School Educated Parents
income 4-1 0.72 0.72 0.60 0.36
income 4-2 0.62 0.36 0.09 0.03
income 4-3 0.54 0.27 0.01 -0.002
Panel C – College Educated Parents
income 4-1 – – – –
income 4-2 – – – –
income 4-3 0.12 0.007 0 0
Notes: Enrolment gaps are computed for diﬀerent ability quartiles, without controlling for parental
education (panel A), only for children with high-school graduates parents (panel B) and for children
with college graduated parents (panel C). An entry for ’income 4-1’ of 0.29 indicates that the enrolment
rate in the lowest income quartile is about 30 percentage points below the enrolment rate of the highest
income quartile. A missing entry (–) indicates that there are no children with parents in this category.
44Table 10: Economy 2000: Average savings of high school graduates (model period j =3 1 ),
controlling for their wealth and income quartile, and the ability quartile of their children.
Ability 1 Ability 2 Ability 3 Ability 4
Wealth 1 Income 1 1.78 1.71 1.55 1.34
Income 2 2.16 2.02 1.75 1.44
Income 3 2.39 2.11 1.79 1.67
Income 4 ----
Wealth 2 Income 1 3.61 3.16 2.78 2.83
Income 2 4.24 3.75 3.31 3.31
Income 3 4.17 3.68 3.35 3.57
Income 4 ----
Wealth 3 Income 1 5.48 5.14 4.82 4.82
Income 2 5.35 4.96 4.61 4.64
Income 3 5.82 5.44 5.30 5.72
Income 4 ----
Wealth 4 Income 1 6.68 6.27 5.90 5.90
Income 2 7.58 7.43 7.44 7.82
Income 3 7.95 7.75 7.79 8.26
Income 4 10.48 10.47 10.59 10.95
Table 11: Economy 2000: Average savings of college graduates (model period j =3 1 ),
controlling for their wealth and income quartile, and the ability quartile of their children.
Ability 1 Ability 2 Ability 3 Ability 4
Wealth 1 Income 1 ----
Income 2 ----
Income 3 1.64 1.61 1.61 1.61
Income 4 1.42 1.80 1.93 1.99
Wealth 2 Income 1 ----
Income 2 ----
Income 3 2.67 3.09 3.12 3.17
Income 4 2.81 3.24 3.42 3.64
Wealth 3 Income 1 ----
Income 2 ----
Income 3 4.27 4.83 4.87 5.31
Income 4 4.40 4.97 5.03 5.53
Wealth 4 Income 1 ----
Income 2 ----
Income 3 5.20 5.85 5.90 6.48
Income 4 7.85 8.52 8.66 9.14
45Table 12: Average Savings and Transfers of High School and College Graduates (in 1983
US-Dollar)
no controls controls
High School 14200 92334 Savings
College 92200 81953
High School 1330 7725 Transfers
College 11900 11100
Notes: All values are obtained through an OLS regression of savings or trans-
fers on a set set of dummy variables. The ﬁrst column only controls for the
education level, while the second column also includes dummies for the wealth
and income level. The results in the second column are predicted values
for a household in the third income percentile the fourth wealth percentile.
Regressions are weighted using the SCF frequency weights. All results are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
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